Introduction
As a result of the 2008 world food crisis, many international investors (private and sovereign funds) have engaged in a race for land acquisition and food production. The phenomenon, however, is increasingly criticised in the public sphere, which commonly refers to it as a 'land grab'. A major question, therefore, would be to determine to what extent Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in agriculture differ from other kinds of FDI, that is, to consider whether agriculture-oriented projects are in essence development-unfriendly.
The few existing reports by international authoritative organisations as well as 35 press and NGO comments collected during the first quarter of 2010 denounce many alleged deals around the world. In many countries, however, land remains the property of the state whilst investment contracts, as strictly confidential documents, are not available publicly. The lack of reliable primary data, in other words, makes it difficult to determine if land is sold or leased on long-term basis.
This working document provides an overview of the trend based on the cross analysis of secondary sources. First, a geographical map of the trend is drawn in an attempt to emphasise who invests and where. Second, its origins are considered, including the 2008 food crises and the impact of increased demand for biofuel. The authors, overall, use the terms of "agri-FDI" and "agri-trend", deemed more neutral than the more subjective "landgrab". This document, in addition, constitutes the basis of a forthcoming paper, which in turn will formulate hypotheses and questions as to whether agriculture-oriented investments differ from traditional FDI.
Country analysis
The first section of this paper focuses on establishing a general and non-exhaustive portfolio of land-dealers sorted in a regional and alphabetical order.
Land-letting states portfolio. (a) African states
Kenya, as a relatively small land-letter, allegedly concluded a 40,000 hectares agreement with Qatar. 1 The Democratic Republic of Congo, on a much larger scale, allegedly sold about 3 million hectares of land. Its most important deal was apparently concluded with China, which acquired 2.8 million hectares for biofuel cultures. 2 The financial counterpart for this deal however remains unknown. The Republic of South Africa also acquired, on the basis of a 30 years renewable lease, 200,000 hectares of land in a deal that allows tax exemptions, export of produces and repatriation of profit without restrictions. 3 5 Ethiopia is another land-selling state, which will be considered further in our research paper while dealing with the correlation between food-aid and land deals. 4 Although the country benefits from international food aid, the government has identified 3 million hectares of land (1.7 million hectares according to another source 5 ) to be leased to foreign investors. Reports suggest that 815 agriculture-related foreign-financed projects have been approved by the government since 2007. 6 Liberia allegedly entered, in 2007, into a US$ 30 million rice production project with the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the Libyan Sovereign Fund. 7 Interestingly, the case illustrates a major criticism of foreign land acquisitions: the ability of foreign investors to fully repatriate harvests to their home-states while possibly leaving local populations without access to the produced food. The Vice-President of the LIA Felipe Gego, on the one hand, affirmed that the company would bring mechanised farming processes allowing three rice harvests per year, to be shared between local and international markets. 8 Although meeting local food needs apparently constitutes an official pillar of the project, NGOs on the other hand suspect that the rice produced might eventually be integrally exported to Libya. 9 Libyan rice needs amounted to the import of 177,000 tonnes worth US$62 million in 2005. 10 Traditionally known as a rice importer, Mali also constitutes a relevant case of land-deals. An important step in the agricultural history of Mali indeed lies in its Government initiative to help farmers produce more and achieve self-sufficiency through a major government reform of the Office du Niger, the agency in charge of managing agricultural and irrigation schemes around the Niger River. 11 Mali has now become a major rice exporter, 12 although increased production and export are not due to improved domestic land-use. Rather, such an evolution is essentially due to the handing over of many lands to the Libyan LIA fund and Chinese companies. 13 The Malian Government, however, is criticised for having recently offered 100,000 hectares of land in Mali's main rice production area, 14 as part of a larger project including roads and canal enlargements. 15 Providing the official Libyan version of the deal, Amadou Kante dit Bany, Representative of the Libyan fund and Charge de mission for the Presidency of the Republic of Mali, emphasises that the 100,000 hectares were originally given for free by Mali to the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) a few years ago. However, because the CEN-SAD process was too slow, Libyan President Kadhafi and Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure decided to create 'Malibya Agriculture', a branch of the LIA collaborating with the Chinese government-led Rice Foundation which provides hybrid seeds. 16 The objective, as the representative formulates, is "to produce rice corresponding to the needs of Mali, Libya, and of all the states of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 6 (CEN-SAD)". 17 Although the project's impacts on Malian needs can be debated, Amadou Kante dit Bany's suggests that "Libyan investment are a godsend for Mali as they originate less from the usually witnessed frenzied profit-seeking motivations than from the political commitment of the two highest leaders of our two brother states to tighten, a little more every day, links of all kinds between our states and peoples". 18 In other words, a political commitment based on south/south solidarity could be a pillar of the foreign land acquisition trend.
Of lower importance is a Malian project with Lonrho, a London Stock Exchange quoted company exclusively focused in South-African development and operating in sectors such as infrastructure, transport, agribusiness, hotels and support services. While a 25,000 hectares deal was allegedly being negotiated in 2009, some recall that the company already owns 25,000 hectares of land in Angola and is currently discussing a 100.000 hectares deal in Malawi. 19 Mozambique is an interesting actor of the current land deal practices because it plays a dual buyer/seller role. Mozambique owns 20,000 hectares of land in Mauritius but also acts as a partner of the LIA Libyan fund, which owns 20,000 hectares of its land. 
(a) Middle-East states
Gulf States, as previously emphasised, play an important role in financing agriculture development in Africa. Their involvement illustrates the recent strong political commitments towards food independency of their leaders. Saudi Arabia FDI agricultural policies, for instance, flow from the so-called 'King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad', amounting to massive levels of investments: US$100 million in Ethiopia, US$45 million in Sudan, 500,000 hectares in Tanzania to raise wheat, barley and rice on the basis of a lease agreement which also envisages investors exemption from tax in the first few years and the ability to export the entire production back home. 42 State-owned as well as privatelyowned investment funds also make a major part of the gulf FDI agricultural policies. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the Al-Qudra Holding planned to acquire 400,000 hectares by 2009 to produce wheat, maize, rice, vegetables and livestock in Australia, Croatia, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Morocco, Pakistan, o
In the Emirates, similarly, the Pharos Miro Agriculture group was launched in November 2009 as a joint venture between Pharos Financial Group (Emirates) and Miro Holding International (London), and attracted the interests of many gulf funds. The fund, amongst other things, seeks 50,000 hectares in Tanzania for rice production and projects to A
(b) North African states
North Africa must also be considered as an eminent player. Previously cited as the main actor of multi-million dollar projects in Liberia, Mali and Ukraine, the Libyan fund (LIA) was created in 2006 to manage Libya's oil revenues and to diversify sources of national income. 45 It is a holding company which manages the investment fund of the government by reinvesting the profits generated by its oil and gas industries in various areas of the international finance market. The Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP) was furthermore established in August 2006 as a branch of the LIA. Ruled by Bachir Salah, President Kadhafi's Cabinet Director, 46 the US$8 billion capital fund benefited from a transfer of the assets of major Libyan funds and financial groups such as the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company controlled by the Central Bank of Libya and [whose] activities include industry, commerce, agriculture, tourism, real estate. The LAP more specifically manages oil revenues, airways companies, investment banks, energy mining and petrochemical industries, hotels, but also owns shares in international football teams such as the Italian Juventus. It has investm A This might suggest that land acquisition makes part of a more general massive FDI trend involving the Middle-East states. As The Economist recently emphasised, Harrods "the luxury department store in London was sold to Qatar's sovereign-wealth fund for £1.5 billion (US$2.2 billion). The Qatari fund has invested heavily in British assets. It is the biggest Through mergers and acquisitions, South Korean investors furthermore invested US$6.5 million to acquire a majority stake in Khorol Zerno (10,000 hectares in eastern Siberia), 52 while Korean companies and governmental institutions also secured deals in Indonesia, Philippines (94,000 hectares), Cambodia, Mongolia. In late 2009, the government furthermore communicated its intention m after an aborted 1.3 million hectares deal in Madagascar. 54 Japan relies entirely on the private sector for its food imports and is therefore said to constitute an active international investor alth m therefore are most likely to buy land abroad. 55
China conducts wide FDI projects in agriculture. Implanted in Cameroon, 56 Congo and Tanzania, it has also started a US$800 million project seeking to "modernise" agriculture in Mozambique. 57 A 2 million hectares biofuel project is also negotiated in Zambia. 58 Projec C a 80.400 hectares deal worth US$21.4million might have been negotiated with Russia. 59
Finally, India, due to soil fertility and water-supply issues, recently had to import 4 million tonnes of lentils from Burma. According to Grain, India even considers sending its farmers there to grow food themselves, 60 and banks might have invested US$150 million to start producing wheat and rice on about 30,000 to 50,000 hectares of land by 2011. 61 It is also reported that 2,000 Indian companies (from a list of 8,000 candidates) might have secured land in Ethiopia where more than US$2.5 billion might have alrea 
Origins and Actors
The facts behind the agri-trend beeing established, its origins should then be considered. The 2008 food crisis appears as a major cause of this FDI race for arable lands. 63 The impact of biofuels should be considered too. That being said, the land acquisition trend is not new, although several evolutions may be witnessed.
The role of the 2008 food crisis
The 2008 food crisis is a major cause of this FDI race for arable lands. In an increasingly globalised context, the correlation of unstable trade exchanges, low food reserves and expanding demography increasing global demand inescapably led to the effect that the single worldwide market failed to provide for the worldwide needs in food supply. 64 The consequences of such a change, generating up to 140% price increases for cereals and raw food, 65 are consequently obvious. As some formulate, "due to the boom, the cost of pasta in Italy is expected to increase by 20%. In the UK, bakeries predict they too will pass on further wheat price rises, and in France the cost of a baguette, a staple of the French diet, is expected to rise". 66 To these could furthermore be added riots in Mexico resulting from an increase in the cost of tortillas generated by more expensive cereals.
Such events eventually took a peculiar dimension once considered by financial minds. Some indeed started to talk of "foodflation", 67 an evolution from what economists at Merrill Lynch called "agflation" in 2007, 68 and introduced the idea that such new prices, far from representing a peak, would provide investors an opportunity to prosper over the coming years. 69 Answering questions on investments prospects in agriculture, Ravi Sood, co-founder and President of Lawrence Asset Management Inc. indeed confirmed that due to massive inflation in agricultural commodities and inputs in 2007-2008, agriculture emerged as its own asset class. Financial interest over agricultural goods might therefore constitute a permanent shift, which suggests that increasing amounts of attention and capital could be directed towards agriculture stocks and commodities in a close future. 70 Suffices to say that the consideration of the food crisis through a profitability perspective led to animated debates, and are at the origin of the so called 'land rush', 71 or 'land grabs' denounced by most commentators. Summarised by Grain, the situation amounts to the following: "on the one hand 'food insecure' governments that rely on imports to feed their people are snatching up vast areas of farmland abroad for their own offshore food production. On the other hand, food corporations and private investors, hungry for profits in the midst of the deepening financial crisis, see investment in foreign farmland as an important source of revenue". 72 Unsatisfactorily, however, such an approach remains barely surface-scratching for the agri-FDI trend cannot be solely considered from the perspective of greedy investors and through the pejorative terms of 'land grab'. First, investors in many cases are as above-mentioned state entities (sovereign states and sovereign funds) investing for the purpose of providing their own populations with food, in which circumstances greed is not to be seen. Second, while it is easy to point-out poor or developing economies selling their lands to investors, few commentators consider whether these countries have the basic financial means to exploit their own land in the first place.
The impact of biofuel production
Corollary to rocketing food prices, the impact of biofuel production should be considered. Several sources indeed mention a World Bank internal document by Don Mitchell, revealing that biofuel production might be at the origin of a 75% growth in food prices. Although the amounts are hardly verifiable due to the confidential nature of the document, the argument nevertheless remains probable. The US, for instance, produced in 2007 about 40 billion litres of biofuel, amounting to 40% of world corn trade. 73 The top-three grain producers' (ADM, Cargill and Bunge) benefits in turn increased by 103% between 2007 and 2009. 74 In other words, the increase in food prices occurred not only from increased demand for alimentary purposes, but also from its use as a green energy resource, the production of which was furthermore increased by the massive peaks in oil prices witnessed recently.
A new trend?
Opinions vary as to the recent nature of the agri-FDI trend. While some argued in December 2008 that "most of the land acquisitions took place during the last nine months", 75 Grain interestingly recalls that in practice "land grabbing has been going on for centuries". 76 Grain makes reference to the post-war Soviet Union collective farms given to foreign investors in 1991, or to the UK attempt to get a former colonial land in Tanzania under Southern Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme. 77 Similar allusions to 'colonial times' also exist in the public debate as far as cocoa and coffee exports are concerned, 78 and the Chinese massive transportation of national farmers abroad gives further credit to the allusion. Overall the comparison between foreign farmland investments and colonialism is not very flattering and remains debatable. Grain, however, is more convincing when it emphasises the presence of a long-term food strategy by contrast to the financial interest of private equity funds, therefore constituting two distinct but parallel agendas surrounding the global farmland investment debate. 79 
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iod. 85 (a) Evolution towards inventive long-term strategies to feed home-populations at a reasonable price Food security issues constitute an underlying factor of the agri-FDI trend, which in turn constitutes an inventive and carefully thought long-term strategy to feed peoples at a good price. For instance, while China has long been recognised as remarkably self-sufficient as far as food is concerned, its demographic evolutions and economic developments led to population migration, eventually replacing agricultural land by industrial infrastructures. In addition, the deterioration of the soil quality due to overexploitation, excessive artificial land fertilisation and inappropriate farming techniques, combined with pollution (by industrial emissions and wastes) reduces the country's chances to answer the needs of its population. Furthermore, while China is due to feed 300 to 400 million people in the next 30 years, urban residents during the same period will increase from 47% to 75% of the population. Increased industrialisation, also, implies the construction of additional roads, factories and infrastructure, and less land shall be available for agriculture in the future. As a result, China imported 42 million tonnes of soya in 2009 from the US, Brazil and Argentina, 80 and is said to have negotiated about thirty agricultural deals in exchange for technologies, training or infrastructures as previously showed. 81 Surprisingly, however, China denies such land deals. Han Jun, expert on rural policy at the Development Research Centre indeed argued: "we don't believe that going to rent farm in other countries is a reliable policy option". 82 That being said, many comments as to Chinese practices challenge such a denial.
South Korea, similarly, is an extremely densely populated country as well as a fast developing nation. As for China, rapid economic and demographic evolution has led to the replacement of farmland and forests by industries and factories, a phenomenon to be associated once again to extensive urban development during the last two decades. As a result, the country is increasingly dependent on food imports, and therefore has increased recourse to foreign farmlands. As previously discussed, growing food overseas remains cheaper and safer than reliance on international trade variations. 83 Perfect examples of desert-based nations, Gulf States, also provide an interesting perspective on the food security issue, for although they suffer insufficient water resources to grow food, their oil and petrodollars grant them the benefit of constituting the client-model of foreign farmland investors. The Emirates, for instance, imported 85% of their food needs in 2008, a costly US$2.9 billion outflow 84 which logically gave it strong incentives to negotiate a US$400-500 million worth project for the exploitation of 100,000 to 200,000 hectares of land in Pakistan during the same per Saudi Arabia, for similar reasons, undertook a self-sufficiency programme consisting in growing wheat in the desert. The country endured the food crisis to the extent that 80% of the population consists of rice-eating migrant workers and hence dependent on food importation. In addition to food shortage and price increases, the Saudi money, indexed on 
13
US dollars -whose value has been decreasing lately as a result of the financial crisis -faced inflation and accordingly suffered more expensive products, raising the cost of its food imports from 8 to 20 billion dollars. 86 The project, however, was abandoned in 2008 by fear of water shortages and the country therefore emerged as a major importer. Following the Emirates' approach (and as demonstrated in the first part of this paper), Saudi Arabia accordingly became an important farmland investor, with the clear objective of exporting its foreign production back home. 87 The Saudi Fund for Development was created in 2008 for this purpose as a US$566 million special investment programme for buying land abroad in order to produce rice and wheat. 88 As Grain explains, Gulf States' strategies therefore consist in growing elsewhere what they cannot afford to produce domestically. As previously demonstrated with Mali and Libya, these states acquire or rent land in the neighbouring Islamic countries, in exchange for capital, oil contracts and cooperation as a means to cut their food costs by 25%. 89 (b) Cash-seeking private-equity funds
The financial interests of private-equity funds constitute a second agenda surrounding the global farmland investment debate. While state entities investing in foreign farmland essentially seek feeding their own populations, financial actors rather consider agri-FDI as profit sources. Although for NGOs "food and financial crises combined have turned agricultural land into a new strategic asset", 90 the scheme is not that simple. While the expectations flowing from price rises generated by the food crisis are obviously debatable, farmland investments cannot be considered as profitable cash-drawers, at least not in the short-run. Indeed, these do not constitute typical speculation in the sense that while most deals are realised upon finished products or existing and palpable resources, such projects require massive investments before production capacities can be improved and generate profits.
Interestingly, however, an evolution in the size of such investors can be emphasised. New conglomerates in practice are bigger than the traditional market leaders such as Nestle, for instance, and this can partly be explained by the fact that more than 40% of FDI nowadays take place through mergers and acquisitions. 91 For instance, while important land transactions traditionally corresponded to 100,000 hectares deals, 92 today's agreements entered into by private investors lead to the negotiation of 400,000 to more than a million of hectares projects. Various commentators furthermore cite the involvement of famous international groups, 93 such as Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Blackrock (a US$200 million hedge fund having allegedly invested US$30 million in land acquisition deals), Morgan Stanley (recently negotiated 40,000 hectares in Ukraine), 94 Renaissance Capital (a Russian fund involved in a 300,000 hectares deal in Ukraine), Landkom (UK fund involved in a 100,000 hectares deal in Ukraine to be extended to 350,000 by 2011 The increasing interest of private funds for agri-FDI projects raises many debatable commentaries. Although comments as to the ability of private funds to make money on the food crisis are most likely founded, denouncing the private sector's objective to seek profit remains far-reaching. NGOs, for instance, denounce that "private investors are not turning to agriculture to solve world hunger or eliminate rural poverty. They want profit, pure and simple […] in many cases, the goal is to generate revenue streams both from the harvests and from the land itself, whose value they expect to go up". 96 The statement, however, remains disturbing since corporation are not created for philanthropic and charge-free activities but rather for explicit profit-making purposes. While this argument has the merit to recall the notion of corporate responsibility, criticising financial groups for their ability to generate benefits therefore remains far-reaching. Food production in itself remains part of world trade and can hardly constitute a reprehensible activity. Questioning food production therefore, only makes sense while taking a food crisis ethical approach. Second, various entities take part in the agri-trend. States obviously lead the process as landletters as well as investors. Funds, then, tend to be increasingly involved as both investment vehicles and fund raising entities. Interestingly the nature of these funds varies from stateowned to privately-held structures, which amongst other things suggests that states overall remain the widest agri-FDI actors. In many circumstances, however, it remains difficult to establish whether investors are state-owned or private-equity entities. The government of China, for instance, is known for being a major shareholder in many companies involved in FDI. 104
Finally, while it is said that many investors seek to make a financial benefit from the food crisis, profits should be separated from state investments responding to national food needs. Thus, the increasing South-South trend in FDI suggests that states benefiting from long-term strategies to feed their people are more illustrative of the agri-FDI practice than the so-called 'land-grab' scandals denouncing the horrendous calculations of easily attackable but nonetheless questionable funds speculating on the food crisis.
